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Ex Parte Deprivation of Telephone Service
to Alleged Gamblers-Police Power vs.
Constitution
by Jules L. Kaufman *
N APaRm 10, 1951 THE Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
through its document number 22,305 issued to the telephone
and telegraph companies doing business in Ohio an "Order to
Show Cause" why certain rules and regulations should not be
adopted by it to govern the said companies in their future opera-
tions. One of the so-called rules and regulations included in the
Order was as follows:
"In the event of objection being made by any govern-
mental authority to the continuance of telephone or tele-
graph service, the company shall forthwith discontinue said
service and notify this commission thereof." (emphasis sup-
plied.)
At the time of the issuance of this Order the telephone companies
were operating under the following General Exchange Tariff:'
"In the event of abandonment of the service, the non-
payment of any sums due, the use of foul or profane lan-
guage, the impersonation of another with fraudulent intent,
listening in on party line conversations, excessive use of
party line, use of the service in such a manner as to interfere
with the service of other telephone users, use of the service
for any purpose other than as a means of communication, or
any other violation of the regulations of the Telephone Com-
pany, or upon objection to the continuance of service made
by or on behalf of any governmental authority, the Tele-
phone Company may either temporarily deny service or ter-
minate the service. Subsequent to the completion of an order
to discontinue service, this will be reestablished only upon
the basis of a new service application." (emphasis supplied.)
On December 21, 1951, subsequent to hearings on the said
"Order to Show Cause," the Public Utilities Commission promul-
* Mr. Kaufman is a graduate of the University of Virginia, A. B., LL. B.,
and is a member of the Ohio and Virginia bars. He is associated in the
general practice of law with the firm of Laronge and Curtis, in Cleveland,
Ohio.
'Ohio Public Utility Commission Order No. 3, General Exchange Tariff,
Section 2, Original Sheet No. 9, Par. B-9.
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gated the following Order based upon the findings set forth,
among others: 2
"(3) It also appearing, from the evidence adduced here-
in, that telephone service and telegraph service have been
and are being used with frequency in the furtherance of (a)
bookmaking, (b) illegal dissemination of racing information,
and (c) other unlawful organized gambling activities, all of
which are hereinafter referred to as 'gambling'; and
"(4) It further appearing, from the evidence adduced
herein, that said commission is charged by law to require all
such public utilities to furnish their products and render all
such services exacted by the commission, or by law, and to
promulgate and enforce all orders relating to protection and
welfare of the public with respect to such services;
"It is, therefore, ORDERED, That the following rules and
regulations be, and hereby the same are, adopted, prescribed
for and made applicable to all telegraph companies and all
Class A, B and C telephone companies doing business within
the State of Ohio and subject to the jurisdiction of this Com-
mission:
"IV. Upon receipt of written notice, from any law en-
forcement agency, that such agency has reason to believe
such utility facilities and service are being used in further-
ance of gambling, such company shall forthwith discontinue
said service." (emphasis supplied.)
The question immediately arises as to the propriety of such
an order, in view of the constitutional principles reserved by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution
upon which the rights of the individual purport to be based.3 It
is apparent that if the term, "shall forthwith," in the Order were
given its usual meaning ("forthwith-as soon as, by reasonable
exertion, confined to the object, a thing may be done."),4 the
telephone of a subscriber which, in the opinion of any law en-
2Ohio Public Utility Commission Order No. 22,305.
'U. S. CoNsT. AMi ms NT V:
"No person shall ... be deprived of... property, without due process of
law."
U. S. CoNsT. AmENDmwT XIV, § 1:
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forcement agency, is being used "in furtherance of gambling"
summarily must be removed. This, it would seem, would occur
without any opportunity being afforded to the subscriber to pre-
vent it, either at a hearing before a commission, by producing
evidence rebutting that relied upon by the complaining law en-
forcement agency to substantiate its opinion, or by obtaining an
injunction restraining such removal until the facts may be ex-
amined by a court of competent jurisdiction. Will such summary
action as provided for in this Order constitute deprivation of
property without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments? The question has been raised as
to the applicability of these amendments, since they are thought
to apply only to federal and state governments, and not to private
organizations, such as telephone companies. Suffice it to say that
for the purposes of this article, it appears that the exercise by
the state of control of the companies, through the Public Utilities
Commission, brings the problem within the purview of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
Whether or not the Constitution will be violated, clearly
such ex parte procedure is foreign to the basic principles of
justice as we know them. Justice Struble in GiorduUo v. The
Cincinnati and Southern Bell Telephone Company5 expresses
this thought:
"The telephone company required the plaintiff to get the
o.k. of the chief of police before it would give the plaintiff
service and withdrew the same upon the request of the chief
of police, all without any hearing as to the gambling charges-
that is police government pure and simple."
At the outset it is to be said to the credit of the telephone •
companies that in almost every recent instance where such a
situation has arisen, the company involved has taken it upon
itself to give notice, in advance of discontinuance, to its sub-
scriber, thus enabling him to take such steps as he feels neces-
sary to prevent the "ex parte" discontinuance of his telephone
service. As a result, it will be appreciated that from a practical
viewpoint and apart from the regulations themselves, discon-
tinuance of telephone service at this time is rarely ever so abrupt
as to deny the subscriber the opportunity to object in advance.
But this article is addressed, not to the reasonableness of action of
'34 Ohio Op. 251,252,71 N. E. 2d 858, 859 (1946).
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the telephone companies in administering this type of regulation,
but rather to the provisions of the regulation itself.
At this point it may be well to emphasize the distinctions
among the proposed regulation in the "Order to Show Cause,"
the final Order No. 22,305 of the Ohio Public Utilities Commis-
sion and the General Exchange Tariff, No. 3, with respect to the
portions which have been quoted above. It is notable that the
Tariff places on the telephone company the burden of determin-
ing what action to take respecting discontinuance of telephone
service (see emphasized portion and particularly the word "may,"
giving the company the option of action), while both the pro-
posed regulation and P. U. C. 0. No. 22,305 make mandatory
upon the company the termination of service, subsequent to re-
ceipt by the company of proper objection by a proper authority.
The distinction between the proposed regulation and the Order is
that, under the former, the objecting authority could have been
"any governmental authority" and the reason for the objection,
being unlimited, would not have been required to be stated, in
the notice; under the latter the authority is limited to "any law
enforcement agency" and the objection to the service must be
specifically that it is being used "in furtherance of gambling."
The intended scope of this article is the examination, from a
constitutional viewpoint, of orders, rules, regulations, statutes,
and ordinances similar to the Order or proposed regulation above
quoted. It is not intended to embody an exhaustive treatment of
the many correlative problems and questions which arise in the
cases dealing with the deprivation of telephone service of a sub-
scriber, or refusal by a telephone company to serve an applicant.
But to insure a more complete understanding of the specific
problem here under examination and to provide a logical frame
of reference some background and certain surrounding circum-
stances should be kept constantly in mind.
The "Right" to Telephone Service
The obvious point of commencement is the examination of
the very nature of telephone service. In return for the favor of
monopolistic operation which is conferred by law upon a tele-
phone company, a public utility, it is charged with the duty of
rendering service without discrimination to members of the
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol2/iss1/4
DEPRIVATION OF TELEPHONE SERVICE
public, by and for which the laws are created." It is universally
conceded, however, that this duty does not preclude the right of a
telephone company ab initio to refuse to furnish service to, or to
contract with, persons whom it has some reason to believe will
use the service for, or in furtherance of, an illegal purpose.7 In
the case of Plotnick v. The Pennsylvania Bell Telephone Com-
pany,s before the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission, the
generally accepted rule was stated in the opinion of the Commis-
sion.
"Complainant's right to telephone service is not an in-
herent right. His right to receive service is dependent upon
the fact of whether or not the use he desires to make of the
service is consistent with the laws of this commonwealth."
A slightly more detailed statement with respect to justifica-
tion for refusal to serve is that of the court in Nevans v. Southern
California Telephone and Telegraph Company: 9
"So far as the duty of a public service corporation to fur-
nish service is concerned, it is not absolute. I think we all
know that. It is subject to reasonable limitations generally,
if necessary, to protect public welfare and public order, and
a public service corporation is not bound to furnish service to
anyone who has-who it has reason to believe will use the
service for illegal purposes."
It has been stated that the duty of the telephone company to
serve-and the corresponding right of the subscriber to receive
service-arises primarily out of the contract for service.10 The
telephone company, having the initial right to determine whether
or not it will contract, may make a summary refusal of an appli-
cation; and this determination, perhaps, might be made upon
'Southwestern Telegraph and Telephone Co. v. Danaher, 238 U. S. 482
(1914); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Call Publishing Co., 181 U. S. 92(1900).
'Howard Sports Daily v. Weller, 179 Md. 355, 18 A. 2d 210 (1941); Rodman
v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., 61 P. U. R. (N. S.) 242 (Mass.
Dept. Public Utilities, 1945); Carrozza v. New England Telephone and Tele-
graph Co., 61 P. U. R. (N. S.) 249 (Mass. Dept. Public Utilities, 1945); McCabe
v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., 78 P. U. R. (N. S.) 127 (Mass.
Dept. Public Utilities, 1949); Partnoy v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 65
P. U. R. (N. S.) 120 (Mo. Public Utilities Commission, 1946); Re Communica-
tions Utilities, Cal. P. U. C., 1948 Dec. #4415.
835 P. U. R. (N. S.) 87 (Penn. P. U. C. 1940).
'Nevans v. Southern California Telephone and Telegraph Co., Case No.
447,702, Dist. Ct., Cal.
" Pollock v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., 289 Mass. 255, 258;
194 N. E. 133, 135 (1935).
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arbitrary grounds. However, if such is the case, the applicant
may then complain to the Commission which regulates public
utilities (usually called Public Utilities Commissions) and from
there appeal to the courts. Through the accepted procedure, an
applicant has full opportunity to procure the service, although
he has no right to it until he establishes that the prospective use
will be proper. In other words, until the condition precedent to
the contract has been met, the applicant for service has been de-
prived of nothing to which he has a right.
As will be seen subsequently, however, where the condition
has once been met, that is, where the company has once been
satisfied that the prospective use of its service by the applicant
will be proper, and the service is being furnished, there is some
authority upon which to base a different conclusion regarding a
summary discontinuance of this service by the company. In the
following pages these situations-the refusal to serve an appli-
cant, and the discontinuance of service to a subscriber-are there-
fore considered as two separate and distinct problems.
Is the Furnishing of Service Illegal
With the understanding that a telephone company may
legally refuse to contract, so long as such refusal is not based
upon arbitrary grounds, and similarly that a proper discon-
tinuance of service must be based upon valid grounds (i.e. from
the standpoint of this article, relating to unlawful use of the
service), we pass to dictum in the case of People v. Brophy.1
While the opinion and holding do not concern themselves directly
with the question under our examination, the following dictum
does provide an indication of the complexity of the general
problem, in pointing up the important, if tenuous, distinction be-
tween the illegal use of telephone service and the illegal use of
information procured by means of telephone service:
"The telephone company has no more right to refuse its
facilities to persons because of a belief that such persons will
use such service to transmit information that may enable
recipients thereof to violate the law than a railroad com-
pany would have to refuse to carry persons because those in
charge believe that the purpose of the person so transported,
in going to a certain point, was to commit an offense.... Fur-
49 Cal. App. 2d 15, 120 P. 2d 946 (1942).
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thermore, the furnishing or receiving of racing or sporting
information is not gambling and is not a crime."
Generally at common law, as is correctly stated in the last
quoted sentence above, the mere furnishing of telephone service
is not in any way illegal. 12 However, in Hamilton v. Western
Union Telegraph Company, the United States District Court
(Ohio) held illegal the furnishing of such service, per se, when
accompanied by the knowledge that it would be used to further
gambling.13 As long ago as 1905, this result was intimated. 14 On
the other hand it has been held that at common law the furnish-
ing of machines which are afterward used for gambling purposes
does not necessarily constitute the furnisher an aider or abettor:
"The furnishing by the defendant of a machine that hap-
pens afterwards, without his privity to be used for gambling,
does not constitute either an aiding, abetting or assisting in
the keeping of a gambling resort." 15
But in 1938, even in the absence of statutes, the Pennsylvania
Public Utilities Commission held that it was not only the right,
but the affirmative duty of a telephone company to refuse to
service any place which has any telephone or telegraph connec-
tions with a race track circuit, or its subscribers, using such fa-
cilities in furtherance of illegal activities. 16
As might be expected, the courts experienced obvious dif-
ficulty in trying to draw the thin line separating legal and illegal
enterprise in the distribution of information which can be con-
sidered merely "news," such as the racing information carried
in the sporting section of newspapers, on radios and television
screens, and the same information, similarly supplied, but per-
12 Hagerty v. Coleman, 133 Fla. 363, 182 So. 776 (1938); State ex rel. Dooley
v. Coleman, 126 Fla. 203, 170 So. 722 (1936); Commonwealth v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., 112 Ky. 355, 67 S. W. 59 (1901); People ex rel. Hammond v.
Breen, 44 Misc. 375, 89 N. Y. S. 998 (1904); Pennsylvania Publications v.
Pennsylvania P. U. C., 349 Pa. 184, 36 A. 2d 777 (1944); Kreeling v. Superior
Court, 18 Cal. 2d 884, 118 P. 2d 470 (1941); See also Tollin v. State, 78 A. 2d
810 (Ct. Gen'l Sessions, Del. 1951).
"v Hamlton v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 34 F. Supp. 928 (D. C. Ohio,
1940); see also: Cullen v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co., 36 P. U. R. (N. S.) 152
(Ohio Com. Pleas, 1940).
" Cullen v. New York Telephone Co., 94 N. Y. Supp. 290, 106 App. Div. 250
(1905).
"State v. Flynn, 76 N. J. L. 473, 72 Atl. 296 (1909); see also: State ex rel.
Dooley v. Coleman, supra, note 12.
" Public Utility Commission v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pennsylvania, 25 P. U. R.
(N. S.) 452.
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verted to the furtherance of gambling. Note the language of the
court in Annette v. New York Telephone Company: 17
"Petitioner is correct in his contentions that the use of
telephones and telegraphs to supply results of horse racing
is in and of itself a lawful use. It is a matter of common
knowledge that horse races are televised and broadcast."
Inasmuch as almost every jurisdiction in the United States,
Nevada excepted, has determined the public policy to be against
gambling, and has enacted criminal legislation against it, many
states (and in some cases cities), in desperation, have enacted
further legislation designed to eliminate the furnishing of
gambling information per se. Two of the briefer acts, cited by
way of example, are as follows:
"Any person, or any express, telephone, telegraph or
other company or corporation, engaged in the business of
carrying or transmitting packages, letters or communication
within this state, whether by express, telegraph, telephone,
or any other means whatsoever, that shall knowingly carry
any message of a kind which shall further or promote the
interest of any unlawful pursuit, or enable a person to carry
on any business or practice declared illegal by any statute
of this state, shall be guilty of a high misdemeanor." 1s
and
"It shall be unlawful for any public utility knowingly to
furnish to any person any private wire for use or intended
for use in the dissemination of information in furtherance of
gambling or for gambling purposes, or for any person know-
ingly to use any private wire in the dissemination of infor-
mation in furtherance of gambling or for gambling pur-
poses." 19
To date, the enactment of legislation of this type consistently
has been held to be a valid exercise of the police power of the
state. 20 The effect of such legislation is succinctly expressed by
the court in Kronenberg v. Southern Bell Telephone Company: 21
1774 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 331 (1947); see also: Commonwealth v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., supra, note 12; Penn. Publications v. Penn. Public
Utilities Commission, supra, note 12; Hamilton v. Western Union Telegraph
Co., supra, note 13.
R. S. 2: 171-3 N. J. S. A.
19 Sec. 365.02 F. S. A., Laws 1949-c 25016, § 2.
McInerny v. Ervin, 46 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1950); Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Co. v. State ex rel. Transradio Press Service, 53 So. 2d 863 (Fla.
1952); State v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co., 121 W. Va. 420, 4 S. E.
2d 257 (1939); State v. Harbourne, 70 Conn. 484, 40 Atl. 179 (1898); Louisville
v. Wehmhoff, 116 Ky. 812, 76 S. W. 876 (1903).
36 P. U. R. (N. S.) 513 (D. C. La., 1940).
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol2/iss1/4
DEPRIVATION OF TELEPHONE SERVICE
"If the defendant telephone company knowingly permits
such uses, whether the law is being violated by the plaintiff
or those with whom he does business, it thereby 'aids' and
'assists' in such violation, or at least puts itself in such a pre-
carious position that no prudent man would wish to take the
chance of prosecution under this statute."
Some states have enacted anti-gambling device statutes.
For example, a portion of the Delaware statute is quoted:
"CONTEST OF SKILL, SPEED OR POWER OF EN-
DURANCE; KEEPING BOOKS OR DEVICES FOR RE-
CORDING, ETC. BETS OR WAGERS; RECORDING
BETS OR WAGERS; OWNERSHIP OR OCCUPYING OF
PREMISES WHERE SAME IS DONE; PENALTY.-Who-
ever keeps, exhibits or uses, or is concerned in interest in
keeping, exhibiting or using, any books, device, apparatus, or
paraphernalia for the purpose of receiving, recording or
registering bets or wagers upon the result of any trial, or
contest in the State of Delaware, or elsewhere, of skill, speed,
or powers of endurance of man or beast... shall be deemed
guilty of a high misdemeanor . , 22
In several instances, the public utilities have been hard put
to prevent the destruction and confiscation of their equipment as
"gambling paraphernalia" under some of these acts.23
Under these "anti-gambling" type statutes, prosecution has
been threatened in many instances in situations where the law
enforcement officials have determined that a particular public
utility was "aiding and abetting" the gambling procedure. It is
to be remembered in fairness to the companies that where there
is no illegality involved in the use of the equipment, they have a
legitimate business interest in securing and keeping subscribers.
Their normal reluctance to discontinue service which occasion-
ally has been found in the situations arising in this field, is per-
fectly understandable when viewed in this light. It is submitted
that this consideration may also play an important role in the
action on the part of the telephone companies in giving notice of
proposed discontinuance of service, instead of "forthwith" (im-
mediately) discontinuing. Be that as it may, there are a few
rare instances in which the utilities have been convicted under
these statutes.2 4
"Revised Code of Delaware 1935, Sec. 4063.
"Pennsylvania Publications v. Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission,
supra, note 12; American Telephone and Telegraph Company's Appeal, 126
Pa. Super. Ct. 533, 191 Atl. 210 (1937); Plotnick v. Pennsylvania Public Util-
ities Commission, supra, note 8.
'State v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 13 N. J. Super. 172, 80 A. 2d 342(1951); Ervin v. Peninsular Telephone Co., 53 So. 2d 647 (Fla. 1952).
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The Dilemma of the Telephone Company
It is readily perceived that if, after being informed by a law
enforcement official that the service is being unlawfully used, the
telephone company maintains the service, it might find itself a
defendant in a criminal action, charged with aiding and abetting
an illegal activity. On the other hand, if the company removes
the equipment and service, without just cause, it thereby might
subject itself to a civil action brought against it by the subscriber.
The consistent position of the telephone companies has been that
when they receive such notification from a law enforcement of-
ficial, this, per se, constitutes just cause for the termination of the
service.
Haggerty v. The Southern Bell Telephone Company,25 is a
case involving the threatened discontinuance of service pursuant
to the company's receipt, from the United States Attorney Gen-
eral and Florida state law enforcers, of notification that the
service was being illegally used. The Florida Supreme Court,
refusing to grant an injunction against the discontinuance, held
the telephone company justified in discontinuing service when
faced with this dilemna. In the opinion was the following lan-
guage:
"The real question in the case at bar is whether or not
equity will compel respondent (telephone company) to fur-
nish petitioner service in the face of a threat from both state
and federal authorities that it will be prosecuted therefor
because the service is being used by its purchaser in viola-
tion of law in the manner detailed. . . . Here we are con-
cerned with the power of a court of equity to relieve a public
service corporation from furnishing service in the face of a
threat of prosecution. . . . We hold that the answer of the
telephone company (i.e. that it had a right to discontinue the
service because of the notice given it by the law enforcement
authorities) to be a good defense." (parenthetical clause sup-
plied.)
It is to be noted that in this suit for injunction there were two
parties, both allegedly innocent. A similar situation existed in
Fogarty v. The Southern Bell Telephone Company,26 in which
the Court refused to grant a permanent injunction prohibiting
the telephone company from discontinuing service to the sub-
scriber. A portion of the opinion reads:
' 145 Fla. 515, 199 So. 570 (1940).
- 34 F. Supp. 251 (D. C. La. 1940).
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"The defendant company, in so considering [its decision
to discontinue service to the subscriber], could also consider
the warning received from the United States Attorney Gen-
eral's office....
"Defendant was legally justified [under the facts known
to it] in believing that its continued furnishing of such serv-
ice was at least contrary to public policy of both the United
States of America and the State of Louisiana, if not illegal.
"Reasonable grounds exist to justify the determination of
the defendant company to no longer service the plaintiff's
race track news dissemination system, and the company
should not be enjoined against [discontinuing such service]."
In Tracy v. Southern Bell Telephone Company,27 the court,
on similar facts held similarly, and rendered an exceptionally
readable and interesting opinion. In these cases the courts, having
looked at the evidence, have determined that as a matter of law
the facts were sufficient to justify a belief on the part of the
telephone company that the service was being used for an illegal
purpose.
The following quotation from the opinion in State ex rel. Tay-
lor v. Nangle2 s draws the problem closer to the direct issue, in
point, respecting the degree of proof required and incidence of
the burden of proof in a service discontinuance case:
"In the instant case the notice from the Governor and
Attorney General would not amount to a judicial finding of
the facts stated therein and would not constitute full and
complete authority for the telephone company to discontinue
service, but coming from the chief law enforcement officers
of the state, it was not to be ignored or lightly considered.
No doubt, the telephone company could have applied to the
Commission for permission to discontinue service. Ap-
parently it was satisfied that the statements contained in the
telegram were true and assumed the responsibility for dis-
continuing service."
As we shall see, this short statement embodies the seeds of sev-
eral thorny questions. As a prelude, some of them include (1)
How much authority is actually required of a telephone com-
pany in order to justify its discontinuance of service to a sub-
scriber? (2) If the telephone company had applied to the com-
mission, would the commission have had the authority to ignore
or override the attorney general's request, assuming it felt the
'37 F. Supp. 829 (D. C. Fla., 1940); Slapkowski v. New Jersey Bell Tele-
phone Co., 67 P. U. R. (N. S.) 33 (N. J. P. U. C., 1947).
227 S. W. 2d 655 (1950).
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facts stated therein were insufficient to establish illegal usage, or
were downright untrue? (3) If the telephone company did not
feel that the facts justified discontinuance, should it have been
obliged, nevertheless, to discontinue service? (4) Did the tele-
phone company actually assume any responsibility for its deci-
sion to discontinue service. If so, how much?
Proof Required for Disconnection
By this time, it will have become quite evident that the bur-
den of proof required to establish reasonable cause for permitting
a telephone company to disconnect its service is probably not as
heavy as that of a plaintiff in any legal proceeding. All that is
needed, apparently, is some justification for a reasonable belief;
but, whatever the degree of proof required, it must be based on
some evidence, as opposed to mere suspicion or opinion, to which
the following statements bear witness:
"The company may not refuse to furnish telephone serv,
ice because of mere suspicion or belief that its facilities are
being used or will be used for illegal purposes." 
2 9
"A telephone company, in order to justify denial of serv-
ice to a subscriber ... must prove that the subscriber's cus-
tomers are using the service ... for unlawful gambling pur-
poses .... Suspicions do not constitute that substantial evi-
dence upon which a Commission finding must be based." 3 0
"Such testimony, while . . . it awakens suspicion . . .
nevertheless falls short of proving that petitioner has been
using telephone service for unlawful purposes. . . . A finding
based upon suspicion would not provide the proper basis
necessary for the statutory validity of the order." 31
At this point, so that we do not stray afield and lose sight of
our goal, the primary question again is reiterated. Briefly, it is
"May telephone service properly be summarily discontinued un-
der Order No. 22,305 pursuant to a naked request by some law
enforcement agency?" In People ex rel. Restmeyer v. New York
'Katz v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co., 80 P. U. R. (N. S.) 76(D. C. P. U. C., 1949).
"Pioneer News Service v. Southwestern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 61
P. U. R. (N. S.) 47 (Mo. P. U. C., 1945).
' Cologiavanni v. Southern New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., 65
P. U. R. (N. S.) 171 (Conn. P. U. C., 1946).
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Telephone Company,3 2 on appeal from a mandamus order of the
lower court directing the telephone company to reinstate the
service of the plaintiff, previously disconnected upon notification
by the police that it was being used for bookmaking, the company
brought in affidavits of the police to justify the permanent discon-
tinuance of the service. Despite the fact that the relator pro-
duced evidence that he had been acquitted in the Magistrate's
court of the charge of gambling, the appellate court reversed the
order of mandamus, including in its opinion the following:
"If there were [a record of discharge by the magistrate
on a gambling charge], the fact that the relator was dis-
charged by the magistrate does not of itself prove the falsity
of the charge, or does the failure to sustain one charge re-
lieve the relator from the burden of others. Order of man-
damus reversed."
The difference in the burden required for criminal conviction
and that required for the removal of telephone service is similarly
in evidence in the opinion of the court in Feldman v. Wallander, s
in which the court nevertheless ordered telephone service, pre-
viously removed at the request of the police, restored to the plain-
tiff:
"Of course, the petitioner's acquittal in the magistrate
court would not establish that he was not using the premises
and telephone for bookmaking; it was simply a legal deter-
mination that the charge against him had not been estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the evidence
relied upon by the Police Commissioner and the telephone
Company to sustain their refusal to authorize further tele-
phone service fails to indicate that the petitioner had ever
been engaged in... bookmaking, or that the telephone in the
premises was ever used for any illegal purpose with plain-
tiff's consent or knowledge."
"159 N. Y. Supp. 369, 173 App. Div. 132 (1916); Ganek v. New Jersey Bell
Telephone Co., 57 P. U. R. (N. S.) 146 (N. J. P. U. C., 1944); But see: Clethero
v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 70 P. U. R. N. S. 131, 134 (N. J. P. U. C.,
1947), wherein the court states, "In the present case, however, the Board must
take cognizance of the fact that the police witnesses produced by the respond-
ent who include the same witnesses mentioned by the chief of police in his
letter of February 6, 1947, to respondent as the basis for the belief that book-
making was being conducted in complainant's premises, testified that at no
time did they have sufficient evidence against him to arrest him for book-
making at the Front Street premises, or to justify any affirmative action di-
rected against the complainant or the premises, other than to request dis-
continuance of telephone service. The Board is of the opinion, therefore,
that the record does not warrant further deprivation to complainant of
telephone service."
- 67 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 395 (1946).
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Upon whom, then, is the burden of proof? Is it upon the sub-
scriber to prove that he has always used the service according to
law? 3 4 Is it upon the telephone company to show facts justifying
its discontinuance of service? 35 Is it upon the police agency to
show facts justifying a reasonable belief on its part, leading to a
request for removal of service? 36 What is the proper jurisdiction
for determining the facts of the case and how much evidence is
required, depending upon the answer to the foregoing questions?
Indicating additional complexities of the matter is the case of
Cyprus v. The New York Telephone Company,3 7 in which the
court distinguished between mere betting on races (admittedly
engaged in by the plaintiff in this action) and "booking" bets,
which activity was not in question in this case. It appears that
telephone service had been unceremoniously discontinued sub-
sequent to a raid by police who had physically removed tele-
phones from the plaintiff's beauty parlor. The court stated:
"It is clear that in the eye of the law the professional
gambler and his customer do not stand on the same plane.
They are not in pari delicto . . . It is thus evident that the
respondent may deny telephone service to a customer only
when it is reasonably sure that it will be used for an illegal
purpose in the future. It has no authority to deny telephone
service as a punishment for past crimes. Presumably the
criminal court inflicts punishment commensurate with the
crime and no other punishment should be meted out by
private organizations."
The telephone company was required by the court to reinstall
service to the beauty parlor. It is submitted that this is a unique
case and not a typical example. Note, however, that the courts
have on many occasions required the restoration of service over
the objection of police.38
"Re Southwestern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 79 P. U. R. (N. S.) 61
(Mo. P. U. C., 1949).
" Whyte v. New York Telephone Co., 73 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 138 (1947); Andrews
v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co., 83 F. Supp. 966 (D. C. Md., 1949).
"Re anfredonio, 183 Misc. 770, 52 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 392 (1944); Dente v.
New York Telephone Co., 55 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 688, (1944); Dees Cigarette and
Automatic Music Co. v. New York Telephone Co., 184 Misc. 269, 53 N. Y.
Supp. (2d) 651 (1945).
192 Misc. 671, 84 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 114 (1948).
" Tavern v. New York Telephone Co., 82 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 515 (1948); Re
Knapp, 83 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 919; Cyprus v. New York Telephone Co., supra,
note 37; Dees Cigarette and Automatic Music Co. v. N. Y. Telephone Co.,
supra, note 36.
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It is interesting to note that, theoretically at least, it is the
character of the use of the service, and not the character of the
user, which must be the basis for the denial of service. In Good-
win v. Carolina Telephone and Telegraph Company39 the court
held that it would not require the telephone company to install
service in a bawdy house, but indicated that in its opinion the
company would have no right to refuse service to the madam,
an admitted prostitute, at another address, unless the company
could prove that she was using the service for business pur-
poses....
The case of Fay v. Miller,40 unreported, is of great interest at
this point for two reasons. First is the dicta following, second is
the fact that this case was decided in 1950 by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, which court since 1952 has appel-
late jurisdiction of cases arising before the Federal Communica-
tions Commission. This fact will assume considerable importance
in the evaluation of the case of Katz et al. v. American Telephone
and Telegraph Company which is later discussed at length.
Briefly, it should be stated that the two Katz cases (both involv-
ing the same facts) directly in point from the standpoint of this
article, have been four times decided-first by the Public Utilities
Commission of the District of Columbia; 41 then on appeal to the
District Court for the District of Columbia; 4 2 then in a proceed-
ing before the Federal Communications Commission; 43 then re-
versed in a re-hearing before the same body; 44 and now remains
pending on the docket for a second re-hearing. It is not unrea-
sonable to conjecture that the case may some time find its way to
the Court of Appeals which, as before stated, decided the Fay v
Miller case following.
The facts of the Miller case were that the plaintiff telephone
subscriber (Miller) sued in the District Court of the District of
Columbia to enjoin the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone
Company from discontinuing his telephone service pursuant to a
136 N. C. 258, 48 S. E. 636 (1904); see also: Andrews v. Chesapeake and
Potomac Telephone Co., supra, note 35.
40 Case No. 10,364 (C. C. A. Dist. Col., 1950).
Katz v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co., 80 P. U. R. (N. S.) 76 (D.
C. P. U. C. 1949).
Id., Civil Action No. 3787-49 (D. C., D. C., 1949).
Katz v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., et al., 86 P. U. R. (N. S.) 65
(F. C. C., 1950).
Id., 92 P. U. R. (N. S.) 1 (F. C. C., 1951).
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request by the United States Attorney for the District of Co-
lumbia (Fay). The request, a letter addressed to the telephone
company, contained the following language:
"This office is in possession of competent evidence that
the following telephone number, WArfield 5061, located at
4923 LaSalle Road, Avondale, Maryland, is being used to aid
and abet in the violation of statutes prohibiting gambling in
the District of Columbia. I, therefore, request that this tele-
phone equipment be disconnected and that such telephone
service be discontinued."
When this request was issued by the United States Attorney the
Company was governed by the following General Exchange
Tariff, adopted as a regulation of the Public Service Commission
of Maryland:
"Use of Service for Unlawful Purposes.-The service is
furnished subject to the condition that it will not be used for
an unlawful purpose. Service will not be furnished if any
law enforcement agency, acting within its jurisdiction, ad-
vises that such service is being used or will be used in viola-
tion of law, or if Telephone Company receives other evidence
that such service is being or will be so used."
Injunction against discontinuance of the telephone service had
issued in the District Court, and no appeal was taken therefrom
by the company. On appeal by the United States Attorney how-
ever, from a companion injunction restraining him from making
such a "request" to have the service discontinued, the court of
appeals made the following statement:
"[But] at the point of imminent or actual removal, the
subscriber may obtain a hearing on the merits of the charges
against him by suing to enjoin the Company. If the Com-
pany cannot then sustain its burden of proof by mustering a
preponderance of the evidence to support the charge of illegal
use, an injunction will issue against it. And if it has acted
only because of the United States Attorney's request, it still
must justify its action by a preponderance of the evidence in
order to keep the telephone disconnected." (emphasis sup-
plied.)
While the obligation of the telephone company was not directly
in issue in the appeal, the dictum must be considered as indicative
of the court's position on the question.
Note that the court specifically did not say that the telephone
company would have been unjustified in discontinuing the serv-
ice, relying upon its receipt of notice from the United States At-
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torney that the telephone service was being illegally used. To
the contrary as a matter of fact, the quoted matter rather indi-
cates that the court did feel that the telephone company would
have been within its rights in so relying. But where there was
opportunity for a prior hearing, the use of the terms "preponder-
ance of the evidence" in describing the company's burden of
proof cannot be attributed to anything except a real desire on the
part of the court to protect fully the right of the subscriber to
telephone service, even at the expense of permitting an illegal
use, which might have been prevented by the telephone com-
pany if it were saddled with a lighter burden. Another excep-
tionally interesting facet of this dictum, from our point of view,
lies in the fact that, according to the language of this court, the
burden of proof rests on the telephone company from the outset
and so continues after the removal of the service. According to.
this statement, in order to justify the continued denial of service,
the telephone company must again prove by the "preponderance
of the evidence" that the service was indeed illegally used. It is
submitted that a "preponderance of the evidence" will require
cold facts, and not merely the opinion of a law enforcer.
In view of the many opinions of courts and Public Utilities
Commissions, prior in time to the decision in Fay v. Miller, hold-
ing that the burden on the telephone company is completely
satisfied by a mere showing that notice was received from a law
enforcement agency and that the company acted in accordance
therewith, this language is indeed noteworthy. Emphasizing
again, this dictum indicates a state of mind on the part of this
court, which tends to require the initial burden of establishing
the legality or illegality of the use of the service to be placed upon
the telephone company, where a prior hearing is procured. Where
service has been discontinued without a prior hearing the burden
is on the company to justify its sustained discontinuance, and this
burden can be satisfied, according to this court of appeals, only by
a preponderance of the evidence. This differs vastly from the de-
cisions later cited which hold that the sole recourse of a subscriber
who has lost his service in this manner is against the law enforce-
ment agency by means of a mandamus suit. As these cases hold-
and they are in the vast majority-once the telephone company
justifies its action in removing the telephone service, by exhibiting
the notification of the law enforcement agency requesting the
discontinuance, the telephone company has completely exonerated
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itself and satisfied its burden. Nor is there any requirement, or
prerogative on the part of the company, according to these cases,
to look into the evidence for the purpose of determining the basis
or motives behind the law enforcement agency's notification. 45
In A. C. and Daily Sports Digest v. New England Telephone
and Telegraph Service,4 6 the Massachusetts Department of Public
Utilities stated the generally accepted view:
"We will not inquire into the motives activating the
police. The tariff provision is a reasonable regulation, and
we cannot say that the telephone company is unreasonably
refusing to furnish service to the plaintiff on the facts here
before us."
The sole evidence adduced by the telephone company, indicating
illegal use of the telephone, was a notification from the law en-
forcement officer that the services were being illegally used.
It is to be emphasized that the language of the court in
Fay v. Miller refuses to allow a shift in the burden of proof, pre-
cisely what is not only allowed, but is required, by Order No.
22,305 of the Ohio Public Utility Commission.
In 1947, the Court of Appeals of New York rendered its de-
cision in the case of Shillitani v. Valentine.4 7 The service of plain-
tiff had been disconnected pursuant to notification by the law en-
forcement authorities that the service was being used for
gambling. The special term had issued an order requiring the
telephone company to reinstate the service,48 which order was
reversed by the Appellate Division.4 9 The Court of Appeals found
that the facts warranted the conclusion that the telephone service
was being illegally used in this case and thus no right of relief
was found to be present. But the language of the opinion is of
singular interest:
"Since the record justifies the conclusion that the peti-
tioner was engaged in [illegal conduct], it follows that he
failed to establish . . . a clear legal right to the relief sought.
Under the circumstances in this case there was no warrant
for compelling the telephone company to reinstate its service
to petitioner. . ..
" See cases cited infra, note 57.
" 79 P. U. R. (N. S.) 159 (Mass. D. P. U., 1949).
" 296 N. Y. 161, 71 N. E. 2d 450 (1950).
4" 184 Misc. 77, 53 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 127 (1944).
"55 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 210 (1947).
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"Neither the police commissioner nor police department
is given any authority to pass upon or regulate applications
for telephone service, or to require a telephone company to
withhold or discontinue its service ...
"Whether or not service should be terminated or discon-
tinued is a decision which must be made by the telephone
company. That power-as well as the duty-rests with the
public utility, and it may not delegate the one or avoid the
other. True, the company is free to consult the police de-
partment or any other law enforcement agency, and may be
guided in its action by the advice received. But whether
the action is justified or warranted must be determined by
the telephone company upon the facts presented."
The majority viewpoint on the question of the burden of
proof required the utility, at least from the standpoint of degree,
is exemplified in Hamilton v. Western Union Telegraph Com-
pany.5 0 The facts of the case indicate that a preliminary injunc-
tion issued against the telegraph company to prevent it from dis-
continuing (as per notification to plaintiff, subscriber) leased
wire service furnished by the defendant to the plaintiff. There-
after a motion was filed by the defendant, telegraph company, to
dissolve the preliminary injunction. The basis upon which the
company acted in informing the plaintiff that it would discon-
tinue service was a notification by the United States Attorney
to the effect that, if it continued to serve the plaintiff it would be
held to be conspiring in a violation of federal and state laws.
The court dissolved the injunction:
"If there is a justification for the defendant's belief that
the information transmitted to the plaintiff over its wires is
being used for an illegal purpose, a court of equity will not
restrain the defendant from discontinuing such service.
"A court of equity will not restrain the discontinuance of
service by a utility if the character of the use of the service
is such as to justify an honest doubt as to its legality."
In McBride v. Western Union Telegraph Company,51 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in 1949 that:
"State and county officers notifying telegraph company
that 'drops' or instruments telegraphically receiving eastern
race track news were being illegitimately used in several
California cities are not required to supply to telegraph com-
pany, in order to permit company to discontinue wire serv-
Supra, note 47.
171 F. 2d 1 (C. C. A. 9th, 1948).
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ice, the probative facts to be adduced in court in trial of
cases of the violation stated in notices."
The typical viewpoint of the public utilities commissions is
expressed in the logical, forcefully written opinion of the Public
Utilities Commission of Connecticut in the case of In re Alexan-
der Presmarita.52 Because the language of this unreported case
expresses with simplicity the majority view on nearly every
point covered in the various Commission opinions, liberty
has been taken in citing this opinion at some length, thus elimi-
nating quotations from various other cases, and enabling a study
of the opinion which might otherwise entail great difficulty. The
facts of this case indicate that the subscriber had purchased, as a
going business, a retail cigar and magazine stand located on the
main street of Hartford, Connecticut. On July 21, 1951, defend-
ant telephone company received notice from the Chief of the
Hartford Police Department that he had received reports of
gambling on the petitioner's (subscriber's) premises and that
same had been observed by officers assigned to the vice and
liquor division of his department. The chief's letter concluded:
"As a result of this report and visit by the Vice Division,
I am recommending that the phone be removed from the
premises."
By registered mail defendant notified the petitioner on July 24th
that his phone would be removed on July 25th, which in fact was
done. On September 7th, petitioner directed a letter to the com-
pany requesting restoration of the service to which the company
replied that it would not restore service until authorized by the
State's Attorney. On November 7th the State's Attorney notified
the company that after examining the evidence he felt that
telephone service should be withheld and the company immedi-
ately notified the petitioner. The petitioner claimed that the in-
ability to use his telephone seriously hampered his legitimate
business. It is to be noted that the recommendation of the Chief
of Police to the defendant company cited the evidence that the
police had amassed and that the telephone company in this case
on the basis of this evidence would have had sufficient grounds
to justify its own determination to discontinue the telephone
service; but the opinion of the Commission does not turn on this
fact. The company relied, in its answer, on provisions of its
tariff which were as follows:
" Case No. 8610 (Conn. P. U. C., 1952).
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"USE OF SERVICE FOR UNLAWFUL PURPOSES-
The service is furnished subject to the condition that it will
not be used for any unlawful purpose. Service will not be
furnished if any law enforcement agency, acting within its
jurisdiction, advises that such service is being used or will
be used in violation of law, or if the Telephone Company re-
ceives other evidence that such service is being or will be so
used."
The opinion treats the subject matter in three parts: (1) the
extent of the company's obligation to provide service, (2) rea-
sonableness of the regulation, and (3) reasonableness of the
company's practices (under the regulation). With respect to the
first part, the Commission stated:
"It is necessary at the threshold of a discussion of the
reasonableness of the Company's tariff provisions, or of its
practices in pursuance thereof, that an understanding be
reached of the obligations placed by law upon a telephone
company to provide service to subscribers.
"A telephone company is a public service company as de-
fined in Section 5390 of the General Statutes and by virtue of
this statute is required by the terms of Section 5410, of the
General Statutes, to render adequate service, at reasonable
rates, to any person within the territorial limits within
which such company has, by its charter, authority to furnish
such service. In addition, the Federal Communications Act
of 1934, as amended, requires telephone carriers to serve the
public without undue or unreasonable preference. Inherent
in both the Connecticut statute and the Federal statute is the
obligation that service be rendered within reasonable limita-
tions. The purpose and desire of the Company to ensure
against aiding and abetting violations of criminal statutes or
becoming itself involved in a violation of a criminal statute
has been recognized as one of the legitimate limitations which
may reasonably be enforced by a telephone company. Peter
J. DeLusia v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, 78 PUR
(N. S.) 22 (1949); Partnoy v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Company, 70 PUR (N. S.) 134, Missouri (1947); Rodman v.
New England Telephone & Telegraph Company, 61 PUR
(N. S.) 242, Massachusetts (1945); Ganek v. New Jersey
Bell Telephone Company, 57 PUR (N. S.) 146, New Jersey
(1944); In re Michigan Bell Telephone Company, 34 PUR
(N. S.) 65, Michigan (1940); Katz v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Company, et al., FCC Docket No. 9500, issued
December 21, 1951.
"The only latitude for difference of opinion lies in the
means which the telephone companies have adopted to pro-
tect themselves reasonably against involvement in unlawful
activities without impairing the obligation imposed upon
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them by statute, to render service when reasonably required
without unreasonable preference or discrimination. We
find, therefore, that the Company's refusal to furnish service
for unlawful purposes as a general principle is not unrea-
sonable. We turn now to a consideration of the tariff provi-
sion designed to implement this policy."
Coming on to the second part, "the reasonableness of the
regulation itself," the Commission commences by citing the Con-
necticut statute under which the telephone company, if it pro-
vides service which is used for an illegal purpose, might be liable
as an accessory after the facts, or otherwise in violation of crim-
inal statutes.53
The Commission then continues its opinion stating that the
first sentence of the tariff by which the telephone company seeks
to protect itself against this possibility is reasonable, inasmuch as
the intent and purpose is perfectly consistent with public policy.
The opinion then goes on to discuss the second sentence which
is similar to the Ohio P. U. C. Order No. 22,305.
"Before we can find that the balance of the tariff provi-
sion is reasonable or unreasonable, we must determine the
extent of the Company's responsibility in discharging its ob-
ligations, to make certain that it does not engage in unlawful
activities. The tariff provision provides that upon the advice
of a law enforcement agency, acting within its jurisdiction,
that a telephone service is being used for an unlawful pur-
pose, it will be removed. Nothing contained in this provision
requires a determination by the Company that a subscriber
is using the telephone for unlawful purposes before it is re-
moved. No reference is made to the guilt or innocence of any
individual. The tariff is directed solely against the use of
the instrument since it is for the use of the instrument that
the Company is responsible.
"Even without the presence of such a rule or regulation
in the tariffs, upon the receipt of a request by a law enforce-
ment agency, acting within its jurisdiction, to discontinue
service, the Company would have little choice but to com-
ply. To hold, as a matter of law, that the reduction of such a
patent principle to tariff form is unreasonable does not ap-
GEN. STAT. CoNN., § 8674.
Section 8674-1. "Any person, whether acting for himself or as agent or
servant, who * * shall install or operate in any room or building, any * * *
telephone *** or other similar apparatus, with knowledge or intent that
such instrument, machine or apparatus is to be used for receiving, trans-
mitting or recording bets or wagers, or for receiving, transmitting or re-
cording the name of any horse or jockey participating in horseracing upon
which bets are or are to be placed 0 * * shall be fined not more than five
hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or both."
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pear sound in law or reason. The actions of a law enforce-
ment agency, when acting within its jurisdiction, are entitled
to the greatest weight and must be presumed to be governed
by the highest standards of impartial and unselfish per-
formance of public duties. State ex rel. Fitzroy v. Trustees
of Firemen's Relief Fund, 122 Conn. 650, 657; 191 Atl. 729. It
is true that there must be a duty imposed upon the public
officer to act in a certain way in order to give rise to such a
presumption, Olson v. Musselman, 127 Conn. 228, 233; 15
Atl. 2d 879. The authority of the State's Attorney and the
Chief of the Hartford Department of Police, however, are
well settled and sufficiently definite to provide reasonable
standards of investigation which must be complied with be-
fore they can conclude that a certain telephone was being
used for unlawful purposes. From this presumption, the
Company may legitimately conclude that the law enforce-
ment agency had made the investigation necessarily required
before informing the Company that a certain telephone was
being used for unlawful purposes. The Company is entitled
to assume and, indeed, must assume that the law enforce-
ment agency so acted until the contrary is clearly shown.
"Nothing to dispute this presumption appears from the
evidence or testimony of record. In fact, there is every in-
dication that an investigation was made before the Chief of
the Hartford Department of Police ordered the removal and
before the State's Attorney refused permission for restora-
tion. Whether the presumption would fail in the event of a
manifest failure by the law enforcement agency to make an
investigation, we need not here decide. It is enough to note
that substantial countervailing evidence in a given situation
will exhaust a presumption, which rests on common ex-
perience and inherent probability at least to the point of
casting the burden on the law enforcement agency to demon-
strate contrary facts. See O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58,
61; 170 Atl. 486.
"The Commission has neither the authority nor the
equipment to perform criminal investigations in determining
the reasonableness of a tariff provision. Moreover, this Com-
mission should not question the purpose or motives of a law
enforcement agency even if an arrest is not made, as was the
case in the proceeding here under consideration. There
may be any number of reasons which might prevent the ar-
resting of any individual or individuals in connection with
the unlawful uses to which the telephone is put. This, of
course, does not mean that the telephone is not being used
for unlawful purposes. Of course, if it becomes clear beyond
any doubt, or if the Company should know as a demonstrable
fact that the telephone is not being so used, it might restore
service even upon the advice of a law enforcement agency
to the contrary since in such a case there is no risk of viola-
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tion of any criminal statute. In case of doubt, however, in
view of the expression of public policy contained in Section
8674 of the General Statutes and in view of the trend of the
decisions as represented by State v. Western Union, Supra,
we cannot hold as a matter of law that a tariff provision
which enables the Company to comply with the orders of a
law enforcement agency is anything but reasonable.
"We are aware of the recent decision of the Federal Com-
munication Commission decision in Katz v. American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company, supra, which holds that the
sentence, here under consideration, is per se unreasonable.
We cannot, however, agree with the conclusions of the ma-jority in that decision in view of the expression of public
policy contained in the general statutes, Section 8674, and in
view of our conclusions respecting the reasonableness of the
Company's determination to avoid implication in any crim-
inal activity. To imply, as does the Federal Communications
Commission, that the Company should have freedom to make
a decision after receiving a notice from the police when there
is genuine doubt is equivalent to saying that the Company
has a choice whether to obey the law. To this latter proposi-
tion, we cannot lend our weight. It seems contrary to public
policy and regulatory principle to hold that any such action
is open to the Company.
"We do not say, as the Federal Communications Commis-
sion decision supra implies that we must, that the Company
is placed on the action end of a circuit actuated by the im-
pulse of the police order and followed invariably by auto-
matic removal. Facts, of course, will always prevail. The
Company has no more choice to assent to a manifestly false
or malicious order to discontinue when it is certain of its
own knowledge that the order is false or malicious than it has
a freedom of choice when the police order a removal in cir-
cumstances not known to the Company. In either event, the
Company merely conforms its action to what in one case it
knows to be the facts, and in the other case, to what it has no
reason to believe and no right to consider, is anything but the
facts.
"The tariff regulation, of course, places upon the law
enforcement agency the primary responsibility of determin-
ing whether or not a certain subscriber will have available
the privilege of telephone service. Doubt immediately rises,
therefore, whether the law enforcement agency by this
method could not succeed in denying permanently the use
of telephone to a given subscriber without ever making an
arrest or instituting criminal action.
"We have no jurisdiction over the activities of a law
enforcement agency and, therefore, cannot compel them to
agree to the restoration of a telephone or to the extension of
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service to a new subscriber. A subscriber, however, is not
left without remedy since the courts are open to him and,
if an adequate remedy at law exists, he may pursue his
action for damage. Queen City Stock and Grain Company v.
Cunningham, 128 Ala. 645; 29 So. 583. If none exists, he may
invoke one of the extraordinary remedies at law, such as, a
bill for injunctive relief. This Commission could not enter-
tain such a procedure and would have no jurisdiction to
order the law enforcement agency to do anything even if it
were equipped and authorized by statute to reach the con-
clusions requisite in making such an order.
"An injunction will lie against a law enforcement agency
or police body if it can be shown that the act sought to be en-
joined was based on an ex parte determination of unlawful
activity, Cannon City v. Manning, 43 Colo. 144; 95 Pac. 537,
unless the obvious purpose is to prevent police interference
with an unlawful business, State ex rel. Daniel v. Kizer, 164
S. C. 383; 162 S. E. 444. Since there is no question of inter-
ference with an arrest involved in this instance and since no
opportunity is presented for judicial determination of the
factual question of guilt or innocence as would be the case in
an arrest, the rule which prevents equity from acting to en-
join an arrest is not applicable (see Anno. 2 LRA (N. S.)
678). As stated by the Massachusetts Department of Public
Utilities in a similar proceeding:
"* * * Unless and until the courts shall decide that the
action of the Police Commissioner in requesting the tele-
phone company to discontinue the service to the petitioner
is unwarranted and baseless, we feel bound to consider
that a request, such as was made to the telephone company
in this case, is a necessary incident in the prevention of
crime and the maintenance of law and order equally bind-
ing upon this Department as upon the telephone company
* * *." Rodman v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 61 PUR
(N. S.) 242, 245. (Bul. 4321.)
"The tariff provisions, therefore, do not deprive a sub-
scriber of the rights of due process since ample opportunity
is offered to him for judicial review and for the invocation of
his civil rights guaranteeing him protection against unrea-
sonable exercise of police power. We find, therefore, that the
tariff rule and regulation is not, in and of itself, unreason-
able."
With the reasonableness of the company's administration of
the regulation, the third part of the opinion, we are not here
concerned. While the point appears to have small meaning in
terms of actuality, it might be well to note that the provision
under which the Presmarita case is decided provides that the law
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enforcement officers who notify the telephone company to dis-
continue service must be acting within the scope of their au-
thority. No such limiting language appears in the Ohio P. U. C.
order No. 22,305 although it may be contended that by implication
it actually is a part of the order. Nevertheless, it would appear to
be a valid question to ask whether or not the language of the Con-
necticut Public Utilities Commission, "the company has no more
right to assent to a manifestly false or malicious order to dis-
continue, etc.... .," would hold true under the Ohio order, which
leaves the company with no alternative to act upon its own in-
formation or even to inquire into the scope of authority of the
notifying officers.
From the dictum in the case of Andrews v. Chesapeake and
Potomac Telephone Company,54 on the other hand, comes the
following expression providing some authority, however slight,
for those who espouse the cause of requiring a hearing, as a
matter of right of the telephone subscriber, prior to discon-
tinuance of service. Noting that the viewpoint expressed in this
dictum is not prevalent in the cases dealing with this subject,
it is nevertheless felt to be worthy of quotation at length, first
because the language sets forth well the fundamental constitu-
tional issue, and secondly because it appears to offer a handy
recapitulation of some of the more important factors covered so
far.
"The plaintiff alleges in her complaint that she received
a letter from the defendant telephone company to the effect
that the company has been advised by the United States At-
torney for the District of Columbia that his office is in pos-
session of competent evidence that the plaintiff's telephone is
being used in violation of the statutes prohibiting gambling
in the District of Columbia and that the United States Attor-
ney has requested the company to disconnect this telephone
equipment and discontinue the telephone service. The letter
further contains a statement that the telephone will be dis-
connected and telephone service discontinued on a date and
at an hour specified in the letter. The plaintiff denies that
the telephone is being employed in violation of the statutes
and claims that it is being used by her in her living and social
activities. She seeks an injunction against the telephone
company from discontinuing service and against the United
States Attorney from advising, coercing, or in any manner
aiding or assisting the telephone company in disconnecting
the telephone equipment.
83 F. Supp. 966 (D. C. Md., 1949).
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"Naturally, it is of importance that the gambling statutes,
and criminal statutes generally, be stringently enforced. It
is of greater importance, however, that this enforcement be
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States. It not infrequently
happens that a person seeking the protection of the Constitu-
tion and laws is himself a person of bad character, but this
circumstance does not diminish his constitutional and legal
rights. This is one of the fundamentals of our system of
government and one of the basic principles of the Bill of
Rights.
"A public utility, such as a common carrier, a telegraph
company, or a telephone company, must serve all members of
the public without discrimination or distinction. In this re-
spect, public utilities are different from other businesses,
such as stores, restaurants, and theatres, which may select
their customers. The fact that a person may be of bad char-
acter does not deprive him of the right to receive service
from a public utility. On the other hand, the facilities of a
public utility may not be used for criminal purposes. A
public utility has not only a right but a duty to refuse to
render service for criminal purposes.
"It clearly follows, therefore, that a telephone company
may refuse to furnish or may discontinue service that has
been furnished if the service is used for criminal purposes,
such as violation of the gambling statutes. The burden of
proof, however, is on the public utility to establish the fact
that the service is being used or is about to be used for a
criminal purpose. Naturally, since this is a civil matter, such
fact need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt. It is
sufficient if it is shown by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence.
"A public utility erroneously refusing service to a person
entitled to it is subject to an action for damages. An action
for damages may be inadequate, however, and, hence, equi-
table relief may be proper. It seems to the Court, therefore,
that before telephone service may be discontinued on the
ground that it is being used for an illegal purpose, the fact
of the illegal use must appear by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. True, there is a provision in the tariff of the tele-
phone company to the effect that telephone service may be
discontinued and not be furnished 'if any law enforcement
agency, acting within its jurisdiction, advises that such serv-
ice is being used or will be used in violation of law . . .' Ob-
viously, if this provision of the tariff is to be literally con-
strued, it is not valid. A public utility may not deprive a
member of the public of his rights to service merely because
it receives a notice from a law enforcement agency that he
is using the service for illegal purposes. A public utility may
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refuse, and, in fact, must refuse, service if to its knowledge
the service is being used for illegal purposes. This fact must,
however, be established. To confer what would amount to
judicial power on a law enforcement officer and to exercise
such power ex parte would be violative of due process of law
and would deprive members of the public of their legal
rights. A public utility may not do this, and neither may a
regulatory administrative body."
To the contrary, the court In re Application of Manfredonio55
upheld the telephone company which had disconnected the tele-
phone of a subscriber pursuant to a request to do so by a law en-
forcement agency. Its opinion indicates that it feels that the bur-
den should rest upon the law enforcement agency to establish
reasonable grounds for requesting the discontinuance and, al-
though the essential nature of the service is clearly recognized,
the court obviously does not feel that such service constitutes a
property right, and that the summary deprivation violates the
constitutional guaranty of due process:
"Telephone service, at one time a luxury, has today be-
come a necessity. The Police Department should not inter-
fere with a subscriber's service unless it acts within reason.
Before it may act in this respect, it must be prepared to sup-
port its action by evidence that the subscriber has used his
telephone for unlawful purposes. Ordinary justice dictates
to the court that the petitioner has the right to speedily in-
quire as to the reasons underlying the discontinuance of his
service."
Following this case the Supreme Court of Weschester
County in Dente v. New York Telephone Company58 held that
the telephone company was justified in discontinuing service to
the plaintiff pursuant to the request of the police, and the burden
was on the police department thereafter to sustain the justifica-
tion for its request and for its refusal to certify the reinstatement
of service. It is to be noted that this case holds that the telephone
company is completely absolved of all responsibility in making
the determination of legality or illegality by its reliance upon the
notification of the law enforcement agency.
"The question here presented is, was the respondent jus-
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the police authorities, without any independent investigation
of its own that there was reasonable grounds to believe that
the telephone was being used for an unlawful purpose? In
other words, was there a legal right to refuse the petitioner
telephone service upon the mere action of the police depart-
ment objecting to the furnishing of such service, especially
where the action of the police may be arbitrary, unreason-
able and discriminatory, and based upon mere suspicion?
Or does the telephone company have to wait until there has
been either a conviction showing the unlawful use of the
phone, or some court action on the part of the police au-
thorities? Here, concededly none was taken.
"The courts of this state have repeatedly given sanction
to the basic proposition or rule that where the police depart-
ment has objected to and disapproved of furnishing tele-
phone service on the ground that it is being used for an un-
lawful purpose, the telephone company has a legal right to
refuse such service.
"Does the law require that a telephone company shall at
its peril determine the legality of an order of the police de-
partment directing a telephone be not restored to premises in
which the police have requested a removal of service for an
alleged illegal use? I am mindful that the position of the
respondent (telephone company) may frequently work
hardship and injustice, and here evidence obtained by the
police department, that the law was being violated, is
tenuous. Following . . . Re Manfredonio (cited above), I
hold that the telephone company was within its rights in dis-
continuing service upon the request of the police department
without an independent investigation of its own. The police
department refuses to rescind its request, and the respond-
ent declines to restore service without such recision or with-
out order of the court. In this stand, likewise, the court holds
that the telephone company was within its rights, that the
police department cannot indefinitely refuse permission to
the telephone company to restore service, where the depart-
ment has taken no action since requesting such discontin-
uance. The question of restoration should not be held in
suspense, however.
"There must be some means open to the petitioner for de-
termination as to whether or not the phone was being used
for illegal purposes. . . . Oral testimony should be taken. I
consequently refer this matter to a referee to hear and report
whether there was reasonable grounds for believing that
the petitioner's telephone was being illegally used."
It would appear to serve little purpose to continue to cite
cases of this nature. Suffice it to say that the weight of authority
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is almost solidly in line with this view5 7 upon which is based the
reasoning of the decision of the Ohio Public Utilities Commission
in Sylvia Miller v. The Ohio Bell Telephone Company,5 8 uphold-
ing the validity of the Public Utilities Commission Order No.
22,305.
Complainant, Sylvia Miller, was a subscriber of the defend-
ant's telephone service at her residence in Columbus, Ohio. On
April 5, 1952 the Director of Public Safety of Columbus directed
and forwarded a letter to the defendant telephone company's
commercial manager requesting the immediate removal of said
telephone service, based upon certain alleged police and vice
squad investigations, resulting in the determination by the vice
squad that the telephone had been used for gambling in the so-
called "numbers game." About April 8, 1952, Mrs. liller's hus-
band was notified in writing by the defendant telephone company
that the line would be discontinued on April 14th. A copy of this
notice was forwarded to the Commission by the defendant. The
complainant, requesting an injunction to require telephone com-
pany to continue subscriber's service made several allegations to
the proper action by the telephone company, the only one con-
cerning us at this point being the eighth.
"(8) That the defendant had made no investigation what-
soever to determine whether certain equipment and facilities
offered and rendered her (complainant) were used unlaw-
fully."
Weinacht v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., Case 6904 (N. J. P. U. C., 1952);
Scance v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 95 P. U. R. (N. S.) 16 (N. J. P. U.
C., 1952); Dade County Newsdealers v. Florida R. R., etc., 48 So. 2d 89 (1950);
Berentano v. N. J. Bell Telephone Co., 76 P. U. R. (N. S.) 1 (N. J. P. U. C.,
1948); Tela-News Flash v. District Attorney of Queens County, 197 Misc.
1015, 96 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 338 (1950); Di Benedetto v. New York Telephone
Co., 83 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 920 (1948); Howard Sports Daily v. Weller, supra,
note 7; Re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., supra, note 34; Partnoy v.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., supra, note 7; Ganek v. N. J. Bell Tele-
phone Co., supra, note 32; Slapkowski v. N. J. Bell Telephone Co., supra, note
27; Rodman v. New England Bell Telephone Co., supra, note 7; Carrozza v.
New England Bell Telephone Co., supra, note 7; A. C. and Daily Sports Digest
v. New England Bell Telephone Co., supra, note 46.
"Case No. 23,078 (Ohio P. U. C., 1952); see also: Bell v. Ohio Bell Telephone
Co., Case No. 23,053 (Ohio P. U. C., 1952); Tinsley v. Ohio Bell Telephone
Co., Case No. 23,067 (Ohio P. U. C., 1952); Hall v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co.,
Case No. 23,068 (Ohio P. U. C., 1952); Brown v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co.,
Case No. 23,072 (Ohio P. U. C., 1952).
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The defense of the telephone company rested upon its tariff,59
and likewise set forth the terms of P. U. C. Order No. 22,305. The
telephone company's position was that (1) it had a right to dis-
continue plaintiff's service under its tariff and (2) it was required
to do so by virtue of the aforesaid P. U. C. Order. The most per-
tinent parts of the opinion follow:
"It is well recognized that whatever right a subscriber has
to telephone service, whether inherent or contractual, is not
an absolute right, but rather is a qualified right. It is quali-
fied to the extent that a public utility is not bound to furnish
service to anyone who it has reason to believe will use the
service for illegal purposes. It is qualified and subject to
greater considerations of law and order and to reasonable
limitations necessary to public welfare and public order....
"Considering first the reasonableness and lawfulness of
said tariff provision, it is clear that, having received from a
governmental authority objection to the continuance of the
service furnished to complainant, defendant's proposal to
disconnect complainant's service was not only in accordance
with but was required by said tariff provision. Complainant,
however, contends, among other things, that said tariff pro-
vision is unconstitutional, unreasonable, unjustly discrimina-
tory and contrary to the public interest. On the constitu-
tional question, complainant states that said tariff provision
deprives her of her property without due process of law. It
seems to be well settled that the requirement of due process
does not always require a hearing before discretion is exer-
cised, but is satisfied if there is opportunity for a hearing and
a judicial determination at some stage. In the instant situ-
ation, the complainant failed to take advantage of the in-
junctive process available against the governmental author-
ity in the courts. Furthermore, the Commission's action in
approving said tariff provision is not, as contended by com-
plainant, a delegation to a governmental agency of the right
to determine who shall have telephone service. Said tariff
provision merely sets forth one of the things which would
constitute reasonable grounds for defendant to believe that
its service is being used in the furtherance of an illegal pur-
pose, and the Commission has merely sanctioned the inclu-
sion in defendant's tariffs of that which is the law independ-
ent of the tariff. On the question of reasonableness, although
several reasons can be given why said tariff provision is rea-
sonable, the reason which particularly impresses this Com-
mission is that it is consonant with good public policy and
P. U. C. 0. Tariff 3:
". .. upon objection to the continuance of service made by or on behalf
of any governmental authority the telephone company may either temporarily
deny service or terminate the service ... "
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promotes the public welfare. As long as it is in the public
interest to prevent gambling, then certainly it is consistent
with the public interest to provide a means such as said tariff
provision to do so. On the question of discrimination, even
though said tariff provision was entirely reasonable, it would
nevertheless be illegal if it resulted in illegal discrimination.
That said tariff provision does not result in illegal discrimina-
tion is clear, however, since it operates uniformly on all sub-
scribers.
"Entirely independent of any consideration of the rea-
sonableness and lawfulness of said tariff provision, the files
and records of the Commission show that said tariff provi-
sion was supplemented by this Commission's so-called 'anti-
gambling' order in P. U. C. 0. Docket No. 22,305, dated De-
cember 21, 1951, which order was made and issued after
public hearings at which all members of the public were
afforded ample opportunity to appear and be heard (Com-
pany Exhibit E).
"Since defendant received written notification from a law
enforcement agency that the telephone serving complainant
was being used in furtherance of gambling, defendant's
proposal to discontinue complainant's telephone service was
in accordance with and required by said Order No. 22,305.
Although there is some doubt that the reasonableness and
lawfulness of said Order No. 22,305 is properly before this
Commission in this proceeding, the complainant has raised
the question and we have considered it. We are not per-
suaded by complainant's contentions. All that has been said
hereinbefore with respect to the reasonableness, lawfulness
and constitutionality of said tariff provision, is equally ap-
plicable to paragraph IV of said Order No. 22,305.
"Complainant alleges that the removal of said telephones
would deprive her of telephone service without provocation
or cause. The evidence shows that defendant received a let-
ter from said Safety Director requesting the removal of com-
plainant's telephone service on the grounds that said tele-
phone service was being used for gambling purposes. The
Commission's said Order No. 22,305 provides that, upon re-
ceipt of written notice from any law enforcement agency that
such agency has reason to believe same are being used in
furtherance of gambling, the telephone company shall forth-
with discontinue such service. It, therefore, becomes ap-
parent that, while the within complaint is directed against
the telephone company, complainant in effect seeks judicial
review by the Commission of said Safety Director's action
to determine whether or not said action was warranted in
the circumstances and, if not warranted, to nullify the Di-
rector's action.
"There is no provision in the public utilities law of Ohio
which indicates legislative intent to vest in this Commission
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power to review the aforesaid action of said Safety Director
and to nullify it if the Commission should conclude on a
record made before it that such action was not justified. Nor
do the provisions of said Order No. 22,305 contemplate such a
review and adjudication.
"Counsel for complainant in this proceeding has sug-
gested that a law enforcement officer (or agency), in re-
questing such discontinuance of telephone service, may be
basing his request on mere assumptions or may be motivated
by a desire to penalize the subscriber. He has further sug-
gested that, unless relief is to be afforded by the Commission
in such cases, subscribers so deprived of telephone service
would have no relief at all.
"The Commission cannot subscribe to these suggestions.
It must be presumed that acts within the proper sphere of a
public official have been properly performed, and without
improper motive. The Commission must also further pre-
sume that the function, of keeping law enforcement officers
(and agencies) to observance of and to acting within the
sphere of their duties and authority, is judicial and not ad-
ministrative; and that, under the laws of Ohio, judicial and
executive powers afford adequate preventive, corrective and
punitive remedies for such actions as may be violative of
their duties and authority.
"Complainant contends that defendant has neither made
an investigation to determine whether complainant's tele-
phone service was being used unlawfully or a report to the
Commission of any such investigation, as provided by said
Order No. 22,305. In view of the provisions of said Order No.
22,305, defendant company, having received notification from
a law enforcement officer (or agency) that the telephone
serving complainant was being used for illegal purposes, had
no obligation to make either an investigation of the use of
said telephone or a report to this Commission, but had the
duty to act forthwith without investigation and without re-
port. The Commission, therefore, finds that said complaint,
insofar as same is based upon such grounds, is not well made
and should be dismissed."
In Millstone v. The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany,60 the court held that a similar order 6 ' of the California
-82 P. U. R. (N. S.) 522 (Cal. P. U. C., 1950).
""'It is hereby ordered that any communication utility operating under the
jurisdiction of this Commission must refuse to establish service for any ap-
plicant, and it must discontinue and disconnect service to a subscriber, when-
ever it has reasonable cause to believe that the use made or to be made of
the service, or the furnishing of service to the premises of the applicant or
subscriber, is prohibited under any law, ordinance, regulation, or other legal
requirement, or is being or is to be used as an instrumentality, directly or
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Public Utilities Commission was valid and that pursuant to notice
given the company by a special temporary crime study commission
the company was forced to suspend its service of a coin operated
telephone to the plaintiff's premises.
We come finally to the cases of Katz v. American Telephone
and Telegraph Company, and Katz v. Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Co.62 which appear to include in the four decisions to
date, the most comprehensive coverage of the immediate problem
involved. Let us have a look at the facts involved. They are set
forth in part in an agreed statement appearing in the opinion of
the original decision of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion:
"On or about the 1 April, 1949, complainants received the
following notice from the Chesapeake and Potomac Tele-
phone Company-March 30, 1949: Dear Mr. Katz: We have
been advised by the U. S. Attorney for the District of Co-
lumbia that his office is in possession of competent evidence
that the following telephone, Adams 7738, furnished you at
3169 Wallbridge Place, N. W., Washington, D. C. is being
used in violation of the statutes prohibiting gambling in the
District of Columbia, and he has requested our company to
disconnect the telephone equipment and disconnect such
telephone service. In compliance with this request, you are
hereby notified that the above mentioned telephone will be
discontinued at 11 A. M. on Wednesday, April 6, 1949. Very
truly yours, (signed) C. B. Schultz, Mgr."
Discontinuance did not occur because an injunction suit was
instituted in the United States District Court 3 to restrain it, and
on November 8, 1949, the United States Attorney withdrew the
request. Upon notification to the complainants, the suit was dis-
missed with the consent of all.
However, at the time of the original notification to subscriber
there was pending an amendment to the Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Company tariff which was due to become effective on
April 18, 1949. As is patent, this amendment would enable the
telephone company, and indeed require it, to suspend its services
to complainant. It appears to have been a formal codification of
indirectly, to violate or to aid and abet the violation of the law. A written
notice to such utility from any official charged with the enforcement of the
law stating that such service is being used or will be used as an instrumen-
tality to violate or to aid and abet the violation of the law is sufficient to con-
stitute such reasonable cause."
cSupra, notes 41-44.
D. C., D. C. Civil Action 1506-49 (1949).
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a long standing "interoffice policy" of the company. The pro-
posed tariff stated:
"17. The service is furnished subject to the condition that
it will not be used for an unlawful purpose. Service will not
be furnished if any law enforcement agency, acting within
its jurisdiction, advises that such service is being used or
will be used in violation of the law, or if the telephone com-
pany receives other evidence that such service is being or
will be so used." 64
On April 14, 1949, four days before the effective date of the
amended tariff, Katz filed with the Public Utilities Commission
of the District of Columbia a petition requesting that the tariff
provision cited above, or any rule or practice of the company
consistent therewith, be canceled, suspended or disallowed.
Among other things, the petition alleged that complainant had
received notice that his telephone would be disconnected, which
action (he claimed) would be arbitrary, capricious, constituting
a denial of his rights without due process of law, and contrary to
the public interest.
In its opinion, the Public Utilities Commission held the tariff
valid:
"It is not the function, nor is it within the power of this
Commission to make judicial determinations. The guilt or in-
nocence of petitioners of violation of law is not a question
before this Commission .... The company may not refuse to
furnish telephone service because of mere suspicion or belief
that its facilities are being used or will be used for illegal
purposes.... The tariff provision in question provides that
service may not be rendered where a law enforcement officer,
acting within his jurisdiction, advises the company that its
facilities are being used for unlawful purposes. It is a com-
monly accepted principle that officers are presumed to do
their duty, and the company should not be placed in the
position of judging the competency of the duly constituted
law enforcement officers. Consequently, it has probable
cause to believe that its facilities are being used for unlaw-
ful purposes when so advised by the duly constituted officer
acting within his jurisdiction ..
The United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia dismissed an appeal from this decision, but only after the is-
suance by the Public Utilities Commission of District of Colum-
bia of an order "clarifying the meaning of the tariff amend-
ment" and its enforcement order, No. 3573, which it had promul-
Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Tariff, F. C. C. No. 3.
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gated in closing its opinion on the Katz case. The amending
order,6 5 required that the tariff provision in question be modi-
fied so as to provide:
"that any subscriber whose service is to be discontinued,
or any applicant to whom service is to be denied under this
regulation, will be notified by the Telephone Company of his
right to a hearing by the Public Utilities Commission of the
District of Columbia to determine whether or not such
service is being used or will be used in violation of law."
On the basis of this modification, and without consideration
of the tariff provision as it had stood prior thereto, the District
Court dismissed the appeal:
"Upon consideration of order No. 3573 of the Public
Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia, as amended
by its Order No. 3590, and of the record of the proceedings
before the Commission, the Court is of the opinion, and so
finds, that paragraph 17 of Tariff P. U. C.-D. C. No. 3 as
amended is not arbitrary or capricious and does not con-
stitute a denial of one's right of due process of law."
Upon analysis, what does this opinion mean, in terms of the
Ohio P. U. C. Order No. 22,305, with which we are primarily con-
cerned? It can hardly be said to sustain the position of those
courts and commissions which had previously held that the only
ground necessary to justify summary discontinuance of tele-
phone service is a mere notification from a law enforcement
agency that, in its opinion, the service is being used to further
illegal ends. To the contrary, it appears that this court would en-
deavor to establish that the subscriber has the right to a hearing
prior to the discontinuance, if he wishes one, and that he likewise
has the right to be notified of a pending discontinuance. But the
most miraculous effect of the decision, based as it is upon the
modifying order, is that the Public Utilities Commission by the
prescribed procedure does actually become the determiner of the
facts and of the law pertaining to them, i.e. the illegality of the
use of the telephone equipment! And this despite its very own
language that "It is not the function, nor is it within the power
of this Commission to make judicial determinations!" So, by its
own modifying order, it would appear that the Public Utilities
Commission has dealt a telling blow to its opinion (and similarly
to the many identical opinions of other public utilities connis-
sions), in which it disclaims all interest in establishing whether
SD. C., P. U. C. Order No. 3590.
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or not the facts do justify the opinion held by the law enforce-
ment agency requesting the discontinuance of service! And this
without mentioning that it has suddenly, with the blessing of the
District Court, pulled itself by its own bootstraps out of the cate-
gory of an administrative agency and into the sphere of a real,
"honest-to-goodness" court. It has been held in one case that the
legislature may by enactment constitute a public utilities com-
mission the determiner of facts respecting the basis for a law
enforcement notification. 66 The court in that case stated:
"I see no constitutional impediment to the legislature's
delegating to a public commission, rather than to the courts,
the jurisdiction to hear and determine the question of
whether or not the notification as to legal use was baseless
and untrue."
It may well be contended, however, that absent such legisla-
tion, and in the light of the many decisions of the various public
utilities commissions holding that the determination of legality
vs. illegality is outside the scope of commission authority, the
modifying order is perhaps a nullity. Where does that leave us?
On November 10, 1949, immediately prior to the said deci-
sion of the District Court (November 16, 1949), Katz filed a com-
plaint with the Federal Communications Commission, objecting
on similar grounds to American Telephone and Telegraph
Tariff,6 7 and also to the identical Chesapeake and Potomac Tele-
phone Tariff,68 which language has been above quoted. It is
interesting to note that at that time the appellate jurisdiction for
cases arising before the FCC was the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. The two tariffs in question had been filed in
response to a request made by the FCC in a letter to American
Telephone and Telegraph Company, dated January 6, 1949:
(Addressed to American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany, 195 Broadway, New York, New York, dated January
6, 1949, from the Federal Communications Commission)
"Gentlemen: It is the Commission's understanding that with
respect to interstate and foreign communication service the
Bell System Companies, as a matter of policy, have in-
structed the personnel not to furnish such service to persons
using the same for unlawful purposes. It is requested that
the Bell System companies file, in accordance with Section
Gardner v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. (Cir. Ct. Fla., 1951).
American Telephone and Telegraph Tariff, F. C. C. No. 132.
Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Tariff, F. C. C. No. 3.
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203 of the Communications Act appropriate tariff regula-
tions with this Commission which will reflect the policies and
practices of those companies concerning this matter insofar
as interstate and foreign communication service is involved.
"In this connection, you are undoubtedly aware of the de-
cision of December 1, 1948, by the United States court of
appeals for the ninth circuit (cited below) in which it was
held that on the basis of regulations contained in Western
Union Tariff F. C. C. No. 219 (a copy of which is attached),
Western Union was within its rights in refusing to restore
to Continental Press Service the leased line service which
Western Union had discontinued upon receiving notice from
law enforcement officials of the state of California that the
service was being used in violation of law. McBride d/b/a
Continental Press Service v. Western Union Telegraph Co.
77 PUR NS 65, 171 Fed. 2d 1.
"By Direction of the Commission
(signed) T. J. SLOWIE"
On February 2, 1950, there was a conference and hearing be-
fore the Federal Communications Commission. In addition to the
constitutional questions presented by the complaint, there is in-
volved in this case the additional problem of the reasonableness
of the regulations and tariffs under certain federal statutes, most
specifically the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. The
opinion, of great interest, is devoted in large part to the specific
determination of the character of the tariffs and regulations solely
from the standpoint of the federal statute. Because of the limited
application, this need not be considered here. It is to be noted
that with respect to the tariffs in issue in this proceeding, there is
no modifying order as there was in the District Court case. It
would seem that this is the only distinguishing factor between
the cases. Excerpts from the initial decision follow:
"The complaint and answer thereto raise the following
issues: (1) insofar as the tariff regulations permit a tele-
phone company to discontinue service to a subscriber, with-
out prior notice or the opportunity to be heard, do they in
effect deprive the subscriber of a property right without due
process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States? and(2) are the tariff regulations of the defendant carrier just as
reasonable as required by Section 201 (b) of the Com-
munications Act of 1934, as amended?
"In examining the constitutional issue raised herein, we
must consider whether the right of which complainants con-
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tend as subscribers they are deprived by reason of said
tariff regulations is such a right as is entitled to protection
in the Constitution. Does anyone have a 'property right' in
the telephone service provided by the defendant's carrier?
Any right to interstate and foreign telephone service which
any one might assert is denied to him by reason of defend-
ant carrier's regulations here involved, and exists by virtue
of the fact that in the exercise of its power to regulate com-
merce, Congress has seen fit, through the instrumentality of
the Communications Act of 1934, to require telephone car-
riers to serve the public without undue or unreasonable in-
terference. (The Commission cites U. S. Light and Heat
Corporation v. Niagara Falls Gas and Electric Company.)
Under the Commission's Act, however, the right of the
public to receive service is not absolute but may be limited
by conditions in the tariff regulations of carriers which, how-
ever, must be 'just and reasonable.' These conditions neces-
sarily include consideration of law and order, such as those
set forth in defendant carrier's telephone regulations and
others similarly compelling, involving the public welfare.
We conclude, therefore, that the public (and complainants
as members thereof) has no unqualified vested property
right to telephone service which may be protected under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, and
that any right to service may be conditioned by just and
reasonable regulations of the defendant carrier ...
"Anyone who is refused service or whose service is ter-
minated by a carrier has recourse by complaint to the
courts under Section 406 of the Communications Act of 1934,
as amended. Furthermore under Section 402 of the Act, the
United States District Courts (in accordance with Chapter
157 Title 28, USCA) have jurisdiction to enforce, enjoin, set
aside, annul, or suspend any order of the Commission. ...
These tariff regulations of defendant carriers cannot of
course enlarge, diminish, or otherwise alter the remedies
provided by law or alter the powers conferred upon the
Commission by the Communications Act. Accordingly, we
conclude that they do not deprive complainants of oppor-
tunity for a hearing in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments....
"It is well settled that 'due process' does not always re-
quire a hearing before discretion is exercised. (The Com-
mission cites Ewing v. Mytinger and Councilberg; Yakus v.
United States; and Bowles v. Willingham. The requirements
of 'due process' are satisfied if there is opportunity for a
hearing and an issue determined at some stage ....
"The tariff regulations do not, of course, relieve the car-
rier of the necessity of showing 'probable cause' for refusal
or discontinuance of service on its own initiative; in order to
operate to relieve the carriers of consequences of damages in
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the event they act without probable cause in such cases. In
any action brought by an individual either to require the
carrier to provide or continue service terminated or discon-
tinued on advice of a law enforcement officer pursuant to
these regulations, or for damages growing out of refusal or
discontinuance of service by the carrier on such advice pur-
suant to its tariff regulation, the complainant will have the
unusual burden of supporting the allegation of which com-
plained. The regulations neither enlarge nor alter that bur-
den. In such actions where the carrier had refused to dis-
continue service at the request of a law enforcement agency,
the burden of the carrier of going forward to show 'probable
cause' would be met by the carrier's showing that it acted
upon such request in pursuance of its tariff regulation. A
complainant would have the usual opportunity of offering
rebuttal evidence to show that the notice from a law en-
forcement agency, upon which the carrier relied was unsup-
ported by fact. Hence, the tariff regulations, in themselves,
in no wise operate to deny complainant's particular use of
the telephone service. Insofar as these tariff regulations may
operate to preclude the recovery of damages to one deprived
of service by a carrier upon notice of a law enforcement
agency that the service was becoming or would be used for
illegal purposes, such circumstance in and of itself does not
require us to find that the regulations in question counter-
vene the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Federal Constitution; and we think for
reasons fully discussed below, the sound basis exists for af-
fording protection to the telephone carrier. We conclude,
therefore, that no denial of due process results from the appli-
cation of these tariff regulations. ...
"The second sentence of the tariff regulations provides
that 'service will not be furnished if any law enforcement
agency acting within its jurisdiction advises that such serv-
ice is or will be used in violation of law, or if the telephone
company receives other evidence that such service is being
or will be so used.' This is in effect, a statement that advice
from a law enforcement agency that service is being or will
be used in violation of law will be considered to be 'probable
cause' for the discontinuance or refusal of service by the
carrier. The carrier is not a law enforcement agency and
should not be required to assume the function of law en-
forcement. The final responsibility of maintaining law, order,
and the prevention of crime is vested in law enforcement
agencies established for that purpose. These law enforce-
ment agencies through their personnel must be presumed to
act within their proper sphere, and without improper mo-
tive. Unless and until the courts shall decide that the action
of a law enforcement officer in requesting telephone carrier
to discontinue service to a subscriber is unmerited in basis,
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we think such a request must be considered an incident in
the prevention of crime and maintenance of law and order,
binding upon telephone company, and has control in deter-
mining the telephone company had 'probable cause' for dis-
continuance or refusal of service. (The Commission here
cites McBride v. Western Union, Haggerty v. Southern Bell
Telephone Company, Tracy v. Southern Bell Telephone Com-
pany, Re Manfredonio, Dente v. New York Telephone Com-
pany, and notes that Andrews v. Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Company holds a contra view.) Moreover were the
carrier to disregard the advice of a law enforcement officer it
might well find itself subject to prosecution for participating
in an illegal enterprise. On the other hand, without some
protection, the carrier refusing or discontinuing service at
the request of law enforcement agency would be under
threat of similar liability in the event the accusations were
unlawfully made by the enforcement officials and in the
final analysis the resulting expense imposed upon the com-
mon carrier is borne by the legitimate users of its service.
We conclude, therefore, that in the light of Section 201 (b)
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, the tariff
regulations here in question are just and reasonable." (paren-
theses supplied.)
In a footnote the Commission points out that the regulations
here under consideration were before the District of Columbia
Public Utilities Commission in 1949 in the case of Katz v. Chesa-
peake and Potomac Telephone Company and that the Commission
held that the telephone tariff regulation was valid, consistent
with public interest, and in no degree a denial of due process. The
Commission also states that regulations similar to those here
under consideration have been found to be just, reasonable and
lawful, by the following additional public utility commissions:
New Jersey Public Service Commission; Missouri Public Service
Commission; and Massachusetts Department of Public Service.
Out of traditional respect for stare decisis, it might be
thought that Katz would have been less aggressive in his attempt
to maintain his telephone service. But not content to rest upon
the defeat he received at the hands of the F. C. C., in this decision
promulgated on November 1, 1950, he filed an application for a
rehearing based on exceptions to the initial decision. Strangely
enough, his application was granted! And on December 21, 1951,
the Commission handed down the following decision reversing its
previous one! (Commissioner Walker dissented, adopting for his
dissenting opinion the earlier unanimous opinion of the Commis-
sion.) The opinion, evidencing perhaps a growing trend toward
41Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1953
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
protection of the telephone subscriber, is quoted in entirety. Soon
after the decision was rendered, on December 21, 1951, the Com-
mission suspended the operation of its order, and so the matter
stands. The tariffs are still on file, and, three years after the U.
S. Attorney made his request of the telephone company to
(forthwith?) disconnect Mr. Katz's service, the telephone is still
in operation, according to the best information available. The
wheels of justice seem to grind slowly, but there is yet hope.
The case is docketed for a second rehearing before the F. C. C.
The final pronouncement in the Katz case-the opinion of
the Federal Communications Commission rendered in December,
1951:
"1. Complainants charge that the tariff regulations are
defective both from the constitutional standpoint and be-
cause they offend the provisions of the Communications Act
of 1934, as amended. We have considered both aspects of
the matter, but have concluded that it is unnecessary to rule
upon the constitutionality of the regulations because, to the
extent stated below, they are unjust, unreasonable, and
therefore unlawful under section 201 (b) of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934, as amended.
"2. The Commission is entirely aware of the significance
of rapid communication in the ramified illegal gambling in-
dustry, to name only one unlawful activity in which trans-
mission of vital information is a factor. We have hitherto ex-
pressed our opinion that the transmission of gambling in-
formation in interstate commerce should be outlawed (see,
e.g., letter to the Chairman of the Senate Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee, dated September 19, 1951,
submitting comments on S. 2116 (a bill to prohibit transmis-
sion of certain gambling information in interstate com-
merce); Senate Report No. 925, 82nd Congress, 1st Session,
page 37). It would be laboring the obvious to say that the
eradication or prevention of crime is a desirable goal, and we
have no wish to see interstate and foreign communication
facilities promote criminal activity. We are of the opinion
that a tariff regulation which expressed the carrier's policy
not to furnish service used for an unlawful purpose would
not be unjust or unreasonable. Nor would it be unjustly or
unreasonably discriminatory, under section 202 (a) of the
Communications Act, to deny telephone service when such
service is being or will be used for illegal purposes. Such a
view is consonant with the general construction of a car-
rier's duty toward illegal enterprises. It would appear, there-
fore, that the first sentence of the regulations under con-
sideration, standing by itself, is unexceptionable, and if the
regulations stopped at that point there could be no quarrel
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with them. But the second sentence, we hold, cannot be
sustained, and we proceed to discuss the regulations in the
light of its presence.
"3. Section 201 (b) of the Communications Act provides
that 'all charges, practices, classifications, and regulations
for and in connection with (interstate or foreign wire or
radio) communication service, shall be just and reasonable';
and declares them unlawful if they do not conform to this
standard. There can be no question of the power of a tele-
phone company, both at common law and under the Com-
munications Act, to adopt reasonable regulations respecting
the conduct of its business and the terms upon which it fur-
nishes service. Southwestern Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. Dana-
her, 238 U. S. 482, 59 L. ed. 1419, PUR 1915D 571, 35 S. Ct.
886, LRA 1916 A 1208; Ambassador, Inc. v. United States(1945) 325 U. S. 317, 323, 89 L. ed. 1637, 58 PUR NS 193,
65 S. Ct. 1151. The second sentence of the regulations states:
'Service will not be furnished if any law enforcement
agency acting within its jurisdiction, advises that such
service is being used or will be used in violation of law, or
if the telephone company receives other evidence that
such service is being or will be so used.'
"The telephone company takes the position that because
of the inclusion of this sentence it will be absolved of lia-
bility to a subscriber or applicant if the action which it takes
with respect to such subscriber or applicant is based upon
the advice of a law enforcement agency. Indeed, defendants
request 'clarification' of the language of the Initial Decision
to put it beyond misunderstanding that they would not be
liable. We are of the opinion that the carrier cannot so avoid
responsibilities which are implicit in its operation. In giving
or in refusing service after receiving the advice mentioned in
the regulation, or the 'other evidence,' the carrier must make
a decision. That such decision may render it liable in the
event of error, either to the subscriber or applicant or to
process for aiding and abetting a criminal violation, does not
eliminate the carrier's necessity to make the determination.
We find nothing in the Communications Act which will per-
mit the carrier to insulate itself from liability for its actions
in connection with the rendition or refusal to render service
in the manner here sought. To the extent, therefore, that
the regulations in question attempt so to protect the carrier
they cannot be upheld.
"4. In addition to the foregoing, we find another reason
why this portion of the regulations cannot be sustained. In
effect, the carrier binds itself to accept in every case the ad-
vice of 'any law enforcement agency, acting within its juris-
diction,' without regard to the nature of the advice. Thus, it
is possible that even though it may be within the knowledge
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of a carrier that the advice given it by a law enforcement
agency is unfounded, the regulations would require ac-
ceptance of the advice and action in response thereto. In
such or comparable situations, the automatic action required
by the regulations would be clearly unreasonable, and conse-
quently the regulations themselves, demanding such action,
must fall.
"5. However, our holding with respect to the second
sentence of the regulations should in no way be cohstrued
as precluding the carrier, in the exercise of the judgment
which it is required to make in furnishing or refusing serv-
ice, from giving the weight or consideration, which it decides
is justified under the circumstances, to any evidence, includ-
ing evidence or representations which may be made to it by
law enforcement agencies. No rule of thumb can be pre-
scribed for application to the situations in which a carrier
must make a decision. It may be observed, however, that
the nature of the offense involved, the strength of the evi-
dence of its perpetration, and the patent need for social pro-
tection demanding immediate action, may in certain cases
prompt the carrier to discontinue service without notice to
the subscriber; while in other cases, perhaps, instanced by
the circumstances under which complainants herein were
threatened with loss of their telephone service, the carrier
may justifiably feel that notice of the proposed discontin-
uance can be afforded the subscriber so that he may avail
himself of legal remedies looking toward continuance of his
service. Manifestly, although the carrier may in some situ-
ations offer the subscriber a grace period during which he
may seek to prevent interruption of his service, in others
immediate action will be indicated. We recognize that these
are questions calling for careful judgment on the part of the
carrier. But the fact that an arduous task may be imposed
upon the carrier, and that it may possibly be visited with
civil or criminal liability in the event of a mistaken decision
on its part, cannot constitute a reason for permitting it to
immunize itself from all responsibility for discontinuance of
service.
"6. Accordingly, as we are of the opinion that while the
first sentence of the tariff regulations of defendants herein
involved is not unlawful, in and of itself, the regulations as a
whole are unjust, unreasonable, and therefore unlawful, to
the extent set forth above the complaint should be sustained.
It is therefore ordered, this 19th day of December, 1951, that
defendants shall file tariff schedules effective not later than
February 1, 1952, or not less than one day's notice to the
Commission and to the public, canceling the second sentence
of each of said tariff regulations, namely, American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company Tariff FCC No. 132, 3rd
Revised Page 10A, Section B, Paragraph 10, and The Chesa-
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peake and Potomac Telephone Company Tariff FCC No. 3,
1st Revised Page llB, Section B, Paragraph 16."
In the event that the decision is again reversed, the appeal,
if taken, will now come before the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, as was previously explained, due to the change
in the law in 1952. This court, it will be recalled, rendered the
decision in the case of Fay v. Miller, which must certainly be
considered as tending toward the protection of the subscriber
from ex-parte discontinuance of his service.
Conclusion
In exasperated conclusion, it can only be said that the ques-
tion is still much in a state of flux as to whether or not such regu-
lations as Ohio Public Utilities Commission, Order No. 22,305,
and actions taken thereunder, constitute an unconstitutional
denial of due process. The large majority of cases, many of which
have been decided by public utilities commissions, however, up-
hold the right of the telephone company to discontinue service
summarily at the request of a law enforcement agency without
the necessity of any further proof of illegal use of the equipment.
There is some authority to the contrary. There is considerable
dicta indicating an awareness on the part of the courts of the in-
creasing economic importance of the telephone, and a correspond-
ing desire to protect the subscriber from the possibility of un-
warranted interference with his service. With respect to the
burden of proof as regards the legality or illegality of use and
the incidence of the burden on the subscriber, telephone com-
pany, or law enforcement agency, there appears to be a consider-
able difference of opinion, clouded by dicta and not susceptible
of any clearcut analysis. It can be said with certainty that the
telephone companies are free to refuse to contract if they have
reason to believe that an applicant will use the service for illegal
means, or to further illegal pursuits. Once service has been
established,-that is, once the burden of proving that he will use
the service properly has been met by the applicant,-the decisions
diverge. There is no question that the telephone company must
have more than a mere suspicion of illegal usage to justify its
discontinuance of service. But where it is the law enforcement
agency which has the "mere suspicion" it appears that the sub-
scriber may lose his telephone before he even learns of it, and
only afterward may require a hearing to recover it. It is im-
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possible to foretell what effect will come of cases like Fay v.
Miller, indicating that the company is justified in relying upon
the notification of the law enforcement officer in the original dis-
continuance of service, but thereafter holding that the company
must sustain by a "preponderance of the evidence" the burden
of proving that the service was indeed illegally used, in order to
sustain a continued refusal to serve. Whether or not this view-
point will prevail over that expressed in "Re Southwestern Bell
Telephone" 69 holding that, given the same facts, the company is
justified in continued refusal to serve until the subscriber proves
that his prospective use will be proper, remains to be seen. The
"off-again-on again" Katz case, while it seems to cover every
facet of the question, leaves much to be desired in obtaining a
positive conclusion on the constitutional question.
In view of the increasing importance of telephone service, it
is submitted that the most satisfactory way to insure the public
against unwarranted stoppages, even if temporary, is to require
notice and the opportunity for hearing prior to discontinuance. It
is submitted that the "cost" involved in permitting temporarily
the continuance of an offense to public policy, only until the
hearing, is far outweighed by the benefit to be received by with-
drawing from the realm of possibility the slightest potentiality
for what Justice Struble has so aptly termed "police govern-
ment."
Supra, note 34.
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